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Entrecaminos Spring 2003

The United States Invasion of Panama: A tri-dimensional analysis

By Rodolfo Vera Calderon

“The U.S. intervention (in Panama) was a stunning event to Latin Americans. The U.S. intervened to defend American citizens and treaty rights, assist democracy, apprehend Manuel Antonio Noriega, and refurbish national prestige. In doing so, the United States destroyed a Latin America military institution and guided the reconstruction of the polity. Latin Americans disapprove at least as much of U.S. military intervention as the do the thuggery of a Noriega. They reason that they all could summon a potential cause for eliciting the forceful wrath of the United States. They would also prefer to solve their own problems. The end of the Cold War has not eliminated the Latin sensitivity toward U.S. intervention.”                                                                 -Gabriel Marcella & Fred Woerner

Abstract

On December 19th, 1989, United States President George Bush approved an airlift into Panama called Operation Just Cause.  Bush issued four reasons as to why United States intervention was necessary in Panama: 1) to protect United States lives, 2) to defend the Canal, 3) to restore democracy in Panama by ending the dictatorship of Manuel Noriega and, 4) to stop drug trafficking. This paper will examine the different levels of analysis that led to the decision to invade Panama. The conclusion will then argue which level of analysis best explains the United States intervention in Panama.

History of United States foreign relationship with Panama

            The Western Hemisphere is the United States sphere of influence, as established by the Monroe Doctrine[1], a warning to European nations to keep their influence away from territory not directly under their sovereignty. After the Latin American nations declared their independence from Spain, they looked to other countries to help them develop economically and politically.  The United States aided these countries economically, as well as politically, by helping certain factions gain power in the respective countries, but only if the leaders helped look out for the United States’ best interests. For example, when the United States was looking to build a faster water route from the Pacific to Atlantic Ocean, they decided that Panama would be the best geographical location. The first attempt to ratify a treaty to build a waterway connecting the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic failed because the Colombian government, who at that time had control of the Panama territory, was not willing to comply with United States’ wishes. When Panama rebelled against Colombia in 1903, the United States dispatched naval vessels to deter the Colombian government from crushing the upheaval.

The newly independent Panamanian government was willing to give the United States the territory to build a waterway. In 1903, United States representative John Hay and Panamanian representative Philippe Bunau-Varilla settled a treaty that granted the United States control of Panamanian territory that included a five-mile radius, extending along both sides of the 52-mile canal. The provisions of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted the Canal Zone “in perpetuity” to the United States and later the Panama Constitution in 1904 “granted the United States the right to intervene in Panama to reestablish public peace.”[2] This treaty, of course, raised the issue of Panama’s sovereignty because the amendment made Panama a protectorate of the United States.  The United States had the authority to intervene in domestic affairs whenever the United States “perceived” intervention as the only available course. As a result, the United States has intervened in Panama several times prior to 1989 at the instigation of one Panamanian faction or another.[3]

In 1921, the Panamanian government asked the United States to issue their interpretation of the amendment. Then, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes defined the United States’ main objectives as their commitment to deter any threat to the Canal Zone and protect the lives and holdings of non-Panamanians[4], mainly United States citizens, in two Panamanian cities.  Panamanian resentment grew after United States intervened in areas not defined in the amendment. In 1925, the United States and Panama negotiated another treaty, the Kellogg-Alfaro Treaty. The Panamanian government did not ratify it because it gave the United States more power in domestic security issues. Later on during the Jimmy Carter administration, new treaties were negotiated with the Panamanian President Omar Torrijos[5] to transfer the Canal to Panamanian control and with the provision that the United States could not use the excuse to defend the Canal to intervene in Panamanian internal affairs or interfere with its political independence or sovereign integrity.[6]  However, as the United States intervention in Panama shows, the United States ignored these treaties and not only interfered in Panama’s politics, but also violated their sovereignty as a state.

Systemic Level of Analysis

            In the systemic level of analysis, attention is paid to international relations that arise from the nature and structure of the world political system and how these factors influence the individual states. The nature of the world political system at that time was one of clashing ideologies between the United States and the Soviet Union, between capitalism and communism, and between democracy and socialism. One of the policies that the United States was practicing during the period leading up to the intervention in Panama was rollback. Rollback is the theory that United States policy makers were determined to return to a pre‑communist world. These policy makers sought to end communism in the Soviet Union and establish free-market capitalism worldwide.[7] With the fall of Cuba to communism, the United States turned its attention to Latin America and became determined to establish and maintain democratic governments.

            The Ronald Reagan and George Bush administrations in the United States both used their War on Drugs to legitimize United States intervention in Latin American countries. The United States concluded that drug-trafficking and left wing social movements were closely related to each other.[8] As Steven L. Spiegal and Fred L. Wehling’s stated, “governments justify their actions in violating another country’s sovereignty in terms of international law, which means that states and other organizations in the world establish a set of rules in their relations with one another.”[9] The increasing cooperation in the world to curb drug trafficking made it feasible for the United States to use drug trafficking as an excuse to intervene in Panama, especially with Noriega’s connection to drug cartels in Colombia.

There were several motives for the United States intervention in Panama, with their War on Drugs playing a great role in their decision, and in the legitimization of their intervention in Panama. Drugs are characterized as a global issue because it has become a major international criminal enterprise. As stated earlier, the United States believed that drug-trafficking and left wing social movements were intertwined. Therefore, the United States needed to maintain its presence in Panama and control of the Canal, to have United States forces ready against any attack and to control drug trafficking. The status of the Canal Zone had long been a factor in Panama’s foreign policy and had strongly influenced domestic and international relations. The 1903 treaty had granted the United States power in Panamanian politics and limited Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone. Several attempts had been made to renegotiate a treaty that was acceptable to both parties. When United States President Jimmy Carter started his term in office, two treaties promised the eventual change of power of the canal from the United States to Panama. However, with the War on Drugs and the fight to establish and maintain democracies in Latin America, continued United States presence was seen as essential in Panama and the reasonable way for the United States to remain in the Panama Canal was by retaining control of the Canal.[10]

Panama’s growing support for Communist countries also added to the United States reason for intervention in Panama. In order to punish countries succumbing to left wing ideals, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Cuba and Nicaragua.[11] Panama, however, alleviated these pressures by providing Nicaragua with goods to sell in their country. Panama’s aid helped maintain the Nicaraguan economy stable enough for the upcoming elections, where the economy’s well being was an important issue.[12] The United States wanted Panama to put more pressure on Nicaragua and Cuba’s economies by supporting the economic sanctions on both of these communist countries, but Panama continued to aid Nicaragua and maintained ties to Cuba. 

Another reason that Panama fell out of disfavor with the United States was that the Panamanian government denied the use of Panama as a base for attacks on Nicaragua and El Salvador.  Panama also refused to accept the United States proposal to extend the presence of the School of the Americas for another fifteen years as well as the presence of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in the Canal Zone.[13] SOUTHCOM was not only responsible for defending the Canal, but it also served as a center for conducting military activities in Latin America. This included developing close relationships with the Latin American armed forces, such as training Latin American military personnel.  In order to maintain this strategic advantage in Latin America and Central America in particular, the United States increased its diplomatic relations with Costa Rica and Honduras. Also, the United States increased its operations to support death squads in El Salvador and rebels in Nicaragua to restore democracy in both Costa Rica and Honduras.

Panama also fell from United States favor by seeking aid from Communist countries.  The United States posed economic sanctions on Panama when Noriega refused to give up his power and after a failed coup to oust him out of power[14]. In response to these economic sanctions, Panama did all it could to resist the economic pressure. Since the United States had discouraged their European allies and Japan from trading with Panama, Panama in turn sought to establish business ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization, North Korea and the Soviet Union.  This movement to establish ties with communists countries came about to establish a more economically and politically independent Panama[15].

The United States, however, perceived this aid from communist bloc countries as a threat.  The United States acknowledges that Panama turned to Cuba and Nicaragua for economic and military aid. Cuba and Nicaragua provided Communist bloc weapons and instructors to Panama and helped create civilian defense committees, the Dignity Battalions, for intelligence and population control.[16]  In addition, Libya provided $20 million in return for use of Panama as a base from which to sponsor terrorist activities and insurgent groups throughout Latin America.

            Due to the strategic location of Panama, the United States was able to oversee military programs in Latin America. This fact played a key role in the United States War on Drugs. In addition, not only was Noriega useful for the connections between the United Sates and other Latin American countries and they’re agendas, but Noriega early on in his career had set up ties not only with CIA officials, but also with important people from other countries. The Panamanian government provided information that helped target drug lords. While Noriega had power over the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), he helped organize a conference of Latin American leaders and the United States in order to aid each other in the War on Drugs in Latin America. One of the methods the United States used was to bring drug charges against Noriega, connecting him with aiding the Mendellin cartel.

Domestic Level of Analysis

            Under the domestic level of analysis, the attributes of individual states affect their actions in the international system. This level of analysis focuses on the preferences and behavior of states and their influence on foreign policies. Actions in both Panama and the United States at the domestic level contributed to the intervention of the United States in Panama.

            For a long time, Panamanians grew resentful of United States presence in Panama. The United States presence in Panama undermined the domestic government’s authority and sovereignty. When the United States supposedly aided a coup to overthrow Torrijos, Torrijos assumed power of the National Guard, or PDF.  He and Noriega eventually made Panama a militaristic government with the PDF having a large control over all sectors of society to some degree or other. In Panama, the PDF controlled a large sector of the economy and government. The growing presence of United States military in Panama caused some tension between the Panamanians and Americans. Before the United States intervened in Panama, the United States sought to make peace or come to an agreement with Noriega. When that failed, the United States aided a few attempts to overthrow the present government, but to no avail.  

The United States started deploying more military to Panama. Several contingency plans were made for the eventual invasion of Panama. The United States also was preparing to aid any government that might replace Noriega. In May 1989, the United States accused Noriega and the PDF of election fraud and sought to gain support from the Organization of American States to denounce the new government, which the OAS did. The United States also compiled carefully to the planned rules of engagement. By the time of the invasion, the United States had their military blocking off roads in Panama and walking around. In the meantime, the United States media demonized Noriega at home before the United States made any public attempts to invade Panama. “The headlines demonizing General Noriega were designed to psychologically prepare the population for the need to send US GIs to kill and be killed.”[17]  The main part of the operation was to take Noriega into custody so that he could have a trial for the wrongs he committed since his rise to power.

The event that prompted an increase in the invasion of Panama was the death of a United States navy officer. PDF officers harassed a navy couple on their way home; they murdered the young man while others groped his wife. At that point in time, when the United States had slowly but surely, increased their military presence in Panama, Noriega passed a resolution that declared a state of war owing to United States oppression. As a result, the contingency plans to invade Panama were speeded up, and so did the deployment of United States officers to Latin America. 

Since the United States had imposed economic sanctions in Panama, by the time that they were ready to invade Panama, people in Panama were awaiting the invasion to relieve the economic crisis they were experiencing. However, the people most affected by the economic sanctions were the middle-class business owners, consisting of a large population of Americans or light colored people. The people who stood to lose from the United States invasion were those Panamanians who were of darker skin color and most likely from the ghettos. These Panamanians are the ones that the Torrijos and Noriega governments aided. The United States had promised Panama that once Noriega was out of power, the United States would give Panama economic aid, especially after the invasion that destroyed several parts of Panama.

            Once the United States was in Panama[18], the media were allowed to go in and report on the events[19]. However, the United States did not alert the media until after already occupying for four hours Panama, and even with the arrival of the reporters, they were only allowed to cover a certain part of the country. This was due because of trips made to the places with the most actions were usually for soldiers involved in the operations. However, the events that the media did cover were the ones portraying Panamanians and Americans happy for the United States intervention[20]. There was also a hostage situation that prompted the United States Crisis Action Team to place Guillermo Endara[21] into power immediately. 

Individual Level of Analysis

            The argument in the individual level of analysis is that leaders have the biggest influence in an international event.[22] The intervention in Panama was due largely to actions made by Noriega because one of the reasons given for the intervention in Panama was that the United States sought to end the Noriega regime and install a democratic government. Noriega was also known to have close ties to the drug cartels in Colombia. The United States demonized Noriega to the point where he gained such ill repute that he was placed among the likes of such men as Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein (both known to defy United States ideals and influence).

            Noriega was born in Panama City, the place where he would first become involved in anti-American demonstrations. He was part of the successful student demonstration pressuring the Panamanian National Assembly to reject the 1947 Filós-Hines treaties that would increase United States military presence in Panama. He attended the Chorrillos Military School in Lima, Peru and shortly after met Torrijos, who Noriega in his memoirs credits as a mentor. Both had nationalistic feelings and agreed that gaining complete Panamanian independence meant limiting United States presence in Panama by transferring the control of the Canal to Panama.  Torrijos sought out Noriega because he thought that Noriega would be an asset to the National Guard, which later became called the PDF. After Torrijos died in a plane accident, Noriega took over the PDF in 1983. There were many that suspected Noriega as the culprit behind Torrijos’ death.

Under Torrijos, Noriega developed several relationships with foreign leaders and those connections carried over into his term in power, but these connections also caused implications for him when the United States sought to undermine Noriega’s character in the eyes of the American public and others. Torrijos assigned Noriega as the sole person acting as intermediary between United States intelligence and Panamanian intelligence. In his role as intelligence communications director, Noriega formed connections with world leaders and also served as intermediary in the relationships between the United States and other countries, such as Cuba.  He allowed the presence of an honorary Israeli consul in Panama who supposedly recruited and trained members of the Panamanian security forces and was also providing Panama with arms.  Once Noriega assumed leadership of the PDF, he refused to comply with several demands made by the United States. The most important factor, perhaps, was Noriega’s stand on maintaining the negotiations made by Torrijos and the Carter administration, which would limit United States presence in Panama.[23]

Results

            Systemic:  One of the results of the United States intervention in Panama was the effect of Latin American countries in the Organization of American States passing a resolution that criticized United States action and the support of Panamanian self-determination.[24] The use of overwhelming military force by the United States generated debate as to its military necessity, political wisdom, and its legality within international law.[25] Individual Latin American countries also showed their disapproval of United States policy. Cuba criticized the United States for their disdain of international law.[26] Under international law, the only valid reason to use force on another country is as a defensive maneuver[27]. What the United States had done was violated a country’s sovereignty by using drug trafficking to justify their actions. Peru asked the United States to withdraw anti-drug operations from Peru; demonstrations of outrage for violating Panama’s sovereignty for military reasons were present in Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. Several Latin American countries asked the United States to withdraw its troops from their countries. Some Latin American countries did not recognize the new government of Endara. The end result in Latin America was that the governments in the region became weary of United States imperialism.

            Domestic: The United States promise of relief after their invasion to Panama was not fulfilled as several Panamanians took to the streets and protested.  The new Endara government was completely in compliance with the United States wishes, and had help in maintaining control of the population[28].  In the United States, people supported the invasion in Panama.  Spending on the military in the 1980s increased greatly, but American public opinion at that time showed a great support for actions taken by the military.

            Individual:  In the United States, Noriega was awaiting a trial, although the United States court system seemed unwilling to do so. He is now incarcerated in a Florida prison[29]. For George Bush Sr., who had been President during the invasion of Panama, ratings went up.

Conclusion

            From the texts, the real reason behind the United States intervention in Panama was to protect United States’ interests, both politically and economically. The United States has a tradition to fund rebel forces in Latin America when the present government falls out of favor, such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba and the Contras in Nicaragua. However, while the governments of Latin America are in agreement with the United States goals, then any type of illegal activity is neglected, as was the case with Noriega. When Noriega started becoming more independent of United States influence, his connections with insurgent groups across the world, but more specifically in Latin America, were no longer ignored. These ties to groups under United States scrutiny then became public attention and were used to justify the intervention of the United States in the South. Considering how Latin American countries are dependent on the North for their economic relationships, it could also be argued that the United States wants to maintain this dependency of the South on the North. This was also seen through the United States economic sanction on Panama before the invasion, which then promised financial aid once Noriega was taken out of power.

            Taking the three levels of analysis into account, the systemic level best proves why the United States intervened in Panama. If it were not for the global issue of drug trafficking and the United States’ War on Drugs, the U.S. would not have had a legitimate reason for their intervention and military presence in Latin America. The United States desire to keep the Latin American governments in check also resulted in the invasion of Panama, mainly because Panama was becoming increasingly rebellious and the United States could not allow for that type of rebelliousness to spread to other Latin American countries, especially with the fight against Communism, which indeed was coming down in the other side of the world with the fall of the Berlin Wall. In addition, the criticism received by the United States was at the international level, with Latin American countries demanding the decrease of American troops and influence in Latin America. Followed closely is the individual level of analysis because if it were not for Noriega’s personal agenda and his decision to play both sides of the card, he would not have fallen out of favor with the United States.

Bibliography

Cockcroft, James D. América Latina y Estados Unidos: Historia y política país por país. Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1996.

Cole, Ronald H. Operation Just Cause, The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama.  Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995.

Dabène, Olivier. L’Amerique Latine au 20e siècle. Paris: Armand Colin, 2001.

Dabène, Olivier. La région Amérique Latine: Interdependence et changement politique. Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1997.

Grant, Rebecca. Operation Just Cause and the U.S. policy process. Rand, 1991.

Johns, Christina Jacqueline and P. Ward Johnson. State crime, the media, and the invasion of Panama. Westport, Connecticutt: Praeger, 1994.

Kjonnerod, Erik L. Evolving U.S. Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1992.

Krieger, Joel (editor). The Oxford companion to Politics of the World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Noriega, Manuel Antonio and Peter Eisner. America’s prisoner: the Memoirs of Manuel Noriega. 1st ed. New York: Random House, c1997.

Rouquié, Alain. América Latina: Introducción al extremo occidente. México: Siglo XXI, 1989.

Skidmore, Thomas E. & Smith, Peter H. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

The Panama Deception. Videocassete, 1992.

The U.S. invasion of Panama : the truth behind operation ' Just Cause'. The Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama. Boston: South End Press, c1991.

Theysset, Edouard. L’Amérique Latine à l’aube du XXIe siècle. Paris: Economica, 1999.

Wiarda, Howard J. American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes. Harper Collins, 1996.


[1] What came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine originated in President James Monroe’s message to Congress on December 2, 1823. The enduring element of Monroe’s statement was warnings to Europeans to keep “hands off” the Western Hemisphere and not to further extend their control in the Americas. The message articulated ideas already well established in U.S. foreign policy. The idea of geographical, political, economic, and social separation of the New World from the Old, with the Americans having distinct interests, dated from before U.S. independence; it complemented ingrained isolationism.

[2] Grant, Rebecca. Operation Just Cause and the U.S. policy process. U.S.A.: Rand, 1991.

[3]Information taken from the Library of Congress website on a country study of Panama at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pa0023)

[4] Library of Congress website

[5] Panamanian soldier and political leader, dictator 1968-78. In 1972, he was declared ‘maximum leader’ for a six-year term by an elected assembly, which granted him full civil and military powers for six years while a civilian figurehead, occupied the presidency. In 1977, he negotiated a new Panama Canal treaty with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, providing for the canal’s eventual transfer to Panamanian control. In 1978, he decided not to run for the presidency, enabling Arístides Royo Sánchez to become president. However, he remained leader of the National Guard and thus effectively controlled the regime until his death in a plane crash in 1981. Born in Santiago, the son of schoolteachers, he became a professional soldier. As a lieutenant colonel in the national guard, he led the 1968 coup that ousted President Arnulfo Arias, and became the country’s effective ruler. Torrijos became a brigadier general in 1969 and, ruling by decree, introduced corporatist economic and social reforms, including land expropriation, and enlarged the public sector. He also banned political parties and imprisoned opponents.

[6] Library of Congress website on Panama. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties were signed on September 7th, 1977 at the Organization of American States. The main Panama Canal Treaty abrogated the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and mandated that the United States gradually turn over to Panama responsibility for the administration, operation, and defense of the canal until the year 2000 –when Panama would have complete jurisdiction and operational authority over the canal. 

[7]Johns, Christina Jacqueline & P. Ward Johnson. State crime, the media, and the invasion of Panama. Westport, Connecticutt: Praeger, 1994, p. 15.

[8] Ibid, p. 9.

[9] Spiegel, Steven L. & Wehling, Fred L. World Politics in a New Era. p. 377

[10] Ibid, ch. 10.

[11] Grant, Rebecca. Operation Just Cause and the U.S. policy process. Rand, 1991, p. 39.

[12] Johns, Christina Jacqueline & P. Ward Johnson. State crime, the media, and the invasion of Panama. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994, p. 41.

[13] The US Army School of Americas (SOA), now relocated in Fort Benning, Georgia, trains Latin American soldiers in combat, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics. Graduates of the SOA are responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in Latin America. Among the SOA’s nearly 60,000 graduates are notorious dictators Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos of Panama, Leopoldo Galtieri and Roberto Viola of Argentina, Juan Velasco Alvarado of Peru, Guillermo Rodríguez of Ecuador, and Hugo Banzer Suarez of Bolivia. Several attempts have been made to close cut federal funding to the school.  (http://www.soaw.org/actnow.html)

[14] As a result of the sanctions, the gross national product shrank by 22 percent between 1988 and early 1991.

[15] Organized labor, deliberately courted and favored by Torrijos in a labor code that guaranteed job stability and minimum wages, was weakened by the high unemployment rate resulting from sanctions imposed by the U.S. in its efforts to remove Noriega. Public-sector employees were similarly demoralized by fiscal austerity and political manipulation. Other social forces and popular movements were co-opted or repressed during the period of military government, leading to their demobilization and fragmentation.

[16] Grant, Rebecca. Operation Just Cause and the U.S. policy process. Rand, 1991, p. 6.

[17] The U.S. invasion of Panama : the truth behind operation ‘Just Cause’. The Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama. Boston: South End Press, c1991, p. 19.

[18] Just Cause, the military operation conducted by U.S. forces in Panama on December 20, 1989, was the most impressive U.S. long-range contingency deployment and combat since World War II. President Bush dispatched more than 20,000 U.S. troops to crush the Noriega regime. Economic damages from the invasion have been estimated as high as $2 billion USD.

[19] According to Wiarda (American Foreign Policy: Actors and processes, 1996), the media opposed President Bush’s interventions in Panama.

[20] According to Krieger (The Oxford companion to Politics of the World, 2001), the U.S. invasion in Panama in December 1989 that ousted Noriega was welcomed locally, despite the more than 550 deaths and widespread destruction and looting ousted.

[21] Born in Panama in 1936. Center-Right politician, member of the Arnulfista Party. In May of 1989, he was elected president over the official candidate, Carlos Duque, in the elections organized and annulled by Manuel A. Noriega. Months after, in December, the U.S. government invaded Panama convinced of Noriega’s participation in drug trafficking toward the U.S.. Once Noriega was taken out of power, U.S. troops putted Endara in the presidency. In November 1992, Endara proposed a constitutional reform and for that purpose made a popular referendum. A great majority voted against the reform, which was interpreted as a rebound to Endara’s government. In 1994 new elections were made to choose a new president, Ernest Pérez Balladares from the opposition Partido Revolucionario Democrático was elected as the new president.

[22] Del Arenal, Celestino. Introducción a las Relaciones Internacionales. España: Rei, 1990.

[23] Even though Noriega’s long association with the U.S. government, including the CIA since the mid-1960 and the DEA in the 1970’s and 1980’s, made him an unlikely figure to lead a genuine nationalist movement when relations with the U.S. deteriorated in mid-1987. His command of psychological operations gave him control with maximum use of fear and minimal violence.

[24] Johns, Christina Jacqueline & P. Ward Johnson. State crime, the media, and the invasion of Panama. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994, p. 72.

[25] Marcella, Gabriel & Woerner, Fred. “Mutual Imperatives for Change in Hemispheric Security Policies: Issues for the 1990’s” in Kjonnerod, Erik L. Evolving U.S. Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1992, p. 46.

[26] Ibid, p. 73.

[27] According to the U.N. charter, article 2 (4) all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

[28] The political forces in power in the post-invasion period had in common a favorable attitude toward U.S. policy, anticommunism, and dislike of the military. While some were interested in recovering access and privileges denied to them since 1968, commercial sectors that had benefited from the 1970s expansion of Panama’s role as an international service ‘entrepôt’ proposed dismantling all restrictions to free trade.

[29] After his arrest, Noriega was declared a prisoner of war and charged with 40 years of jail with drug trafficking charges.

***

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